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A series of trust games were conducted in Chile to
analyze whether the past 2010 earthquake
affected trust and trustworthiness in rural
communities. Results show that trust levels are
invariant between villages affected by the
earthquake and villages not affected by this shock
(control group). However, we find statistical
evidence that trustworthiness has diminished in
areas affected by the earthquake. Results are
relevant for policy regarding aid and recovery of
communities affected by these types of disasters.
Based on Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe 
(1995), our game can be described by: 
a) Participants are invited and gathered in 
a room, where two subgroups are 
randomly formed: group A and group B. 
Group A is designed to be the senders or 
“trustors”. Group B is designated to be the 
receivers or “trustees”. 
b) The researcher explains that each 
participant in group A (the trustors) will be 
endowed with a quantity of money p, and 
that each trustor will have the “secret” 
choice to send part of her endowment to 
some random participant in group B (the 
trustees). The money to be sent (s) can 
be any amount in the range 0 ≤ s ≤ p. It is 
clearly stated that the final amount sent 
by the trustor, s, will be converted to 3s 
by the researchers.
c) Group B is moved to another room 
where they lose contact with participants 
of group A. Trustors are endowed and 
asked to decide in a secret booth how 
much to send.  
d) Once the trustee receives the money 
(3s), they have to opt to return any 
amount (r) to the trustor (who remains 
anonymous). The trustee can return any 
amount in the range  0 ≤ r ≤ 3s. Then, the 
trustor receives the money returned by 
the trustee, r, and the game concludes. 
s and r/3s are considered to be metrics 
of trust and trustworthiness, 
respectively.
p = $6,000 Chilean pesos (≈U$13), given 
(and multiplied) in $1,000 bills.
Given the natural experiment’s conditions given by the 
covariate shock of the 2010 Chilean earthquake, the 
main objective of this study is to analyze whether trust 
and trustworthiness in Chile was affected by the 2010 
earthquake. 
Trust games were conducted in areas affected by 
the earthquake (treatment group) and regions not (or 
much less severely) affected this event (control group). 
-Treatment group: 5 villages of the VII region (see map)
-Control: 4 villages from the IV to VI regions (N to S)
An average of 25 rural dwellers participated in the 
9 different games conducted during March and May 
2011. Game protocol, rules, organization, support 
materials and research assistants were exactly the same 
across experiments. Control villages were selected 
based on socioeconomic characteristics, demography 
and location.
Evidence from the experiments shows that trust levels among people living in 
villages affected by the earthquake are not different from trust levels in non-affected 
communities. However, at the moment of reciprocating trust, the trustworthiness 
measures by r/3s, illustrates that there is a different pattern of response between 
affected and non-affected areas. The results therefore suggest that a natural 
disaster produces a type of breakdown of pre-established social-contracts. In other 
words, natural disasters provide individuals the excuses to break such contracts. As 
natural disaster appeared to diminish trustworthiness, policy makers and recovery 
programs should focus on reinforcing the capacity building and social capital of 
affected communities. 
Several economic studies have used the investment or 
trust game (Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995), or similar 
versions of it,  to observe trust and  trustworthiness 
across individuals and communities. Some researchers 
argue that not only trust and trustworthiness can be 
measured with this experiment, but a range of different 
perceptions. For this reason the trust game has gained 
much attention and applicability in experimental 
economics [Johnson & Mislin (2010) provide a meta–
analysis over 143 studies]. 
Despite the growing body of literature using the 
trust game format to evaluate different behavioral 
responses under diverse conditions, to our knowledge 
no study has addressed how traumatic events –denoted 
by natural disasters– affect people’s trust or 
trustworthiness. This is a very important aspect, 
especially because it can determine the effectiveness of 
policy or programs aimed to support  and recover 
communities affected by this type of shock. Considering 
that international and regional institutions are placing 
increasing resources to help recover social and 
economic damages resulting from by natural disaster 
events, understanding how trust and  trustworthiness are 
affected in post–disaster environments is a key issue. 
Improving trust and  trustworthiness could contribute to 
more effective community response and consolidation of 
safety nets.
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Trustworthiness (r/3s)
Treatment group Control group
Earthquake villages Control villages
(s) (r/3s) (s) (r/3s)
Dominant Mode 2 0.33 2 0.33
Mean (median)  2.29 (2) 0.28 (0.22) 2.17 (2) 0.36 (0.33)
Standard deviation 1.58 0.24 1.08 0.24
t-test for equality of mean, equal 
variance assumed 0.69 0.08* 
[0.01**]
t-test for equality of mean, equal 
variance not assumed 0.66 0.08* 
[0.02**]
Mann-Whitney U test for equality of 
distributions 0.87 0.03** 
[0.02**]
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Note to table: test values correspond to two-tailed p-value. Squared brackets show p-values of sample 
excluding outliers given by r/3s = 1  (3  and 2 observations in earthquake and control groups, respectively).
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